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Following Veeman (1987), a milk marketing
board (MMB) is a legislatively specified
compulsory marketing institution that
conducts price discrimination. Since price
discrimination leads to unequal profitability
between products, receipts from sales are
pooled and farmers are paid a single price
adjusted for composition and quality. The
exact set-up of MMBs and the corresponding
pooling arrangements vary between countries.
The United States has a pooling arrangement
involving fluid and industrial milk through
the Federal Milk Marketing Order (US-
MMO) system. In Canada1 and Japan liquid
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1. The Eastern Agreement on All Milk Pooling and the Western Milk Pooling Agreement. Until the spring of
2003, exports (class 5) had a common pool.
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and manufacturing milk prices are pooled
regionally. Norway has a special arrangement
where the pooling takes place through the
Norwegian Agricultural Marketing Board
(NAMB). Until 1994 the United Kingdom
had MMBs that set prices on milk to the
dairies according to end use, and until recently
farmers in Australia had to pay a levy that was
used to subsidize exports.
It is well documented that price
discrimination through MMBs entails an
efficiency loss to the society. In table 1 we
review the most recent documentation, while
appendix 1 offers a broader list of references.
Based on an interregional market equilibrium
model that was calibrated on U.S. data from
1995, Cox and Chavas (2001) found that
eliminating the US-MMOs would lead to a
decline in the producer surplus by USD 368
million, and an increase in the consumer
surplus by USD 505 million. The calculated
efficiency loss of the USD-MMOs (USD 137
million) amounts to 0.7 per cent of the
production value of milk. Lippert (2001)
reviewed the Canadian milk market and
evaluated the efficiency loss by the regulation
of the Canadian supply of milk to be CAD
200 million, i.e. 4.8 per cent of the production
value. According to Freebairn (1992), the levy
on milk in Australia generated a relatively
small deadweight loss in the domestic market.
However, the resulting excess production that
was exported involved relatively large
deadweight losses.2 These costs were estimated
to be between AUD 25 to AUD 65 million a
year, depending on the size of the supply
elasticity. For the United Kingdom, Anderson
(1996) found that eliminating the MMBs,
would give an efficiency gain of ecu 298
million. Kawaguchi, Suzuki and Kaiser
(1997) studied the Japanese milk markets.
According to their analysis the pooled farm
price of milk would decrease by 14.7 per cent
if markets were deregulated (perfect
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2. The pool pricing arrangements provided farmers with price signals in excess of the export parity price in the size
of 25% for New South Wales, Western Australia and Queensland, 33% for Victoria and 40% for Tasmania.
Table 1: Efficiency loss in MMBs
Research Production Loss in Gain in Efficiency loss
value consumers’  producers’ (per cent of
(million) surplus surplus production value)
(per cent of (per cent of
production value) production value)
Existing MMBs
Canada Lippert (2001) CAD 4,1871 - - 4.8
United States Cox/Chavas (2001) USD 19,6132 2.6 1.9 0.7
Previous MMBs
Australia Freebairn (1992) 1.4-3.83
United Kingdom Anderson (1996) Ecu 3,0644 12.6 2.9 9.7
1. Lippert (2001), p. 9 and p. 57 
2. Cox and Chavas (2001), p. 98 and p. 102
3. Freebairn (1992), pp. 35-37
4. Anderson (1996), p. 64, p. 145 and pp. 151-152
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competition). Unfortunately, they did not
report any welfare effects.
From table 1 we read that the efficiency
loss from the US-MMOs and from the
Australian levy-system seems to be small. The
loss from the Canadian MMB is larger. Based
on the research of Anderson (1996), the loss
from the now abolished British MMBs was
more substantial. However, one should be
careful when interpreting the results from the
various studies. First, the MMBs in the various
countries differ both in type and strength.
Second, the assumed elasticities of demand
and supply affect the results. For example, one
reason for the large difference between the
loss in consumer surplus from upholding the
US-MMOs and the UK-MMBs (2.6% versus
12.6%) is that the demand for dairy products
is assumed to be more elastic in the US
compared to the UK study.
In this paper we focus on another reason
for efficiency losses to differ among countries,
i.e. that the propensity to export varies. As
reported by Ippolito and Masson (1978) and
Serck-Hansen (1979), and more recently by
Bergman (1997), exporting MMBs may incur
a larger efficiency loss than non-exporting
MMBs. The argument is as follows. If exports
are allowed, milk production can be taken out
of the domestic market to elevate domestic
prices. This results in a large deadweight loss
because it involves a transfer of money from
the home to the foreign country. There will
also be a welfare loss if an MMB does not
export. However, in this case the transfer goes
between domestic consumers. Consequently,
the welfare loss is limited to pure deadweight
losses in domestic consumption. Ceteris
paribus, the efficiency gain from abolishing
an MMB should therefore be greater in high
as compared to low exporting MMBs.
In table 2, existing MMB-countries are
ranked according to the size of the export
share, found in the first column. The second
column repeats the efficiency losses from table
1. The United States has a low export share
and a low loss, while Canada has a high export
share and a moderate loss. As is discussed later,
a main part of the Canadian export is outside
the MMB-system. We therefore lack results
on efficiency gains from abolishing MMBs in
countries where the export share is large.3
Against this background Norway may serve
as a useful case. Exports of dairy products are
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3. Of the previous MMB countries, Australia has a large export share (appr. 45 %), and, according to table 1, a
low efficiency loss. However, the low efficiency loss is understandable since Australia is a cost effective country
in production. According to the International Dairy Federation (2002), the farm gate price was only half of the
level in the U.S. For England we lack information on exports.
Table 2: Export share in dairy products and efficiency losses in existing MMBs
Export share1 Efficiency loss
Per cent; 1999 Per cent of production value
Norway 15.0
Canada 10.0 4.8
United States 3.9 0.7
Japan 0.0
1. International Dairy Federation (2002), country reports pp.22-44 and table 21
2. OECD (1996)
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high and are financed through the MMB
system.
The next section surveys the Norwegian
dairy policy in more detail. In particular we
discuss the market regulation scheme set up
by the NAMB. Dairies have to pay a
compulsory tax on profitable products, while
unprofitable products receive a subsidy. By
law, this scheme has to be self-financing, i.e.
the collected taxes shall equal the paid
subsidies. Then, a numerical model of the
Norwegian agricultural sector is used to
simulate the current policy with price
discrimination through the NAMB (the base
solution). Thereafter, effects of deregulating
the markets for dairy products are discussed.
First, we assume that export subsidies are
phased out. By comparing this case with the
base solution, the cost of export is revealed.
Thereafter, a complete deregulation is
considered. Here, domestic prices on dairy
products equal marginal costs. Thus,
Harberger distortions in the domestic markets
are eliminated. Our conclusion is that
substantial efficiency gains may be achieved
by deregulating the dairy sector. The potential
gains are substantially higher than for other
MMB-countries. The main reasons are that
exports are a major ingredient of the
Norwegian system, and that production costs
are very high.
The Norwegian dairy policy
The Norwegian dairy market is dominated by
a single farmer-owned cooperative. At the
farmgate level the cooperative’s market share
is 98%, which means that nearly all milk
farmers are members of the cooperative.  The
presence in the downstream industry is also
strong, with a competitive fringe serving only
10% of the end market.
As is described carefully in the literature
(see e.g. LeVay, 1983), a marketing
cooperative tends to maximize the output
price paid to the members, subject to a budget
constraint, which says that the total payments
to the members cannot exceed the net
revenues from the domestic market and the
export market. The constraint will always be
binding. Thus, the behavior is also known as
the zero surplus solution.
The zero surplus solution is a good
approach to the Norwegian dairy market. To
maximize the farmgate price, the cooperative
price discriminates between different end uses
of milk (e.g. fluid milk, cheese, butter and
milk powder) and between different markets
(domestic and export).  Like a price
discriminating monopoly would behave, the
cooperative limits output in the price inelastic
markets (e.g. fluid milk). However, compared
to a regular vertically integrated monopoly,
milk production will be higher as the net
revenue is disbursed to the members as a part
of the farmgate price. Naturally, a problem
for the cooperative is to avoid cream
skimming from entrants (private dairy
companies) in the high-value segment.
Initially we abstract from this, assuming that
the cooperative has a monopoly in domestic
markets. We also assume that the cooperative
is protected from foreign competition through
prohibitive tariffs.4
Figure 1 illustrates the zero surplus
solution and compares it to: a) perfect
competition, and b) the behavior of a regular
vertically integrated monopoly.
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4. The import tariffs, resulting from the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (GATT, 1994), are in the
range of 250-400 per cent.  Minimum access opportunities equal to 5 per cent of domestic consumption in the
base period, are established at lower tariffs.
Essays on the inefficiency of Norwegian agricultural policy 14
In panel a, which depicts the price inelastic
market (e.g. fluid milk), the demand for milk
is given by DA. The more elastic curve DB in
panel b represents the demand for other
domestic uses of milk (cheese, butter, milk
powder, etc.). MRA and MRB are the corre-
sponding marginal revenue curves. Aggregate
curves, illustrating the price-quantity
formation under different market structures,
are presented in panel c. DA+DB is the
aggregate demand for milk, while MRA + MRB
is the horizontal sum of the marginal revenue
curves in panels a and b. S is aggregate supply,
which is the horizontal sum of the marginal
cost curves of the individual farmers. We
assume constant marginal costs in inputs
other than milk, for simplicity normalized to
zero. P
_
E is the exogenous export price, which
coincides with the flat part of the marginal
revenue curve, MR.  
With perfect competition, the equilibrium
solution is at the intersection of the aggregate
demand and supply curves. The quantity
AP+BP is produced, to a farmgate price PP, of
which AP and BP are sold in the two domestic
markets, respectively. Since the marginal costs
in inputs other than milk are normalized to
zero, the price on both processed goods will,
in this case, be equal to the farmgate price, PP.
If, on the other hand, the milk farmers and
the dairy sector behaved like a regular
vertically integrated monopoly, they would
supply the quantity AM + BM that follows from
the intersection of the aggregate marginal cost
curve, S, and the aggregate marginal revenue
curve, MR. This quantity would be distri-
buted among the markets so as to equate the
marginal revenues in each market and the
farmgate price PM. Thus, the price and
quantity combinations would be (PMA, A
M) and
(PMB, B
M), respectively, in the two end markets.
This would leave the cooperative with a
substantial profit, which would have to be
distributed to the members somehow, without
affecting the quantities supplied (lump sum).  
Unable to distribute profits in a lump sum
fashion, the practice has been to raise the
farmgate price until the net profit in the
domestic markets is just as large as the loss in
the export market. In other words, the farmers
are paid a price equal to the average revenue
(AR), which is a weighted average of the price
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Figure 1. 
Market structure: cooperative versus perfect competition and vertically integrated monopoly 
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obtained in different markets. Referring to
figure 1, this principle results in a farmgate
price, P, and a milk production, A + B + E,
given by the intersection of the farmers’ supply
curve, S, and the solid curve, AR, defined as:
AR=αAPA + αBPB + (1 – αA – αB) P
_
E,
where αi , i = A,B, is the share of total
production sold in the ith domestic market.
The price and quantity combinations in the
domestic markets, which follow from the
intersection of the marginal revenue curves
and the exogeneously given export price 
(MRA = MRB = P
_
E ), are now (PA, A ) and 
(PB, B). The export price, P
_
E, is below the
marginal costs in production. 
As figure 1 illustrates, total milk produc-
tion is higher under a cooperative regime than
in a competitive market (A+B+E > AP+BP),
but domestically sold quantities are lower 
(A < AP; B < BP). Obviously, since the export,
E, takes place at a price below marginal costs,
economic welfare is highest in the competitive
solution. However, the milk farmers find the
cooperative regime more attractive since it
offers a higher farmgate price (P > PP), as well
as a higher activity level.
Compared to the regular monopoly
solution, the cooperative supplies higher
quantities in the domestic markets (A > AM; B
> BM). Nevertheless, economic welfare and
producer’s surplus are lower because the rent
from price discrimination is shifted from
domestic producers to foreign consumers. So,
the producers would prefer a regular
monopoly if they were able to distribute
revenue without affecting production.       
So far we have considered a cooperative
that unilaterally has power to set domestic
prices. In actual fact, this power is restricted
by price caps set in annual negotiations
between the farmers’ organisations and the
government. The larger the farmers’ bar-
gaining strength, the closer the price caps are
to the unregulated prices. We are taking these
price caps into consideration in figure 2.
Assume that the cooperative faces price
caps P
_
A and P
_
B that are below the unregulated
prices. The cooperative will then supply A
_
and B
_
units in the domestic markets. In panel
c of figure 2 the stepwise curve labeled MR is
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Cooperative facing price caps
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the (constrained) aggregate marginal revenue
curve. The AR curve will now be defined by:
AR = αAP
_
A + αBP
_
B + (1-αA-αB) P
_
E
where ai , i = A,B, as before, is the share of
total production sold in the ith domestic
market. 
With AR pricing, production will be A
_
+
B
_
+ E. Again, the export, E, takes place at a
price below marginal costs in production,
leading to a deadweight loss equal to the
hatched area in panel c.5 There are also
deadweight losses in the domestic markets due
to price discrimination, equal to the hatched
triangles in panels a and b.
Price discrimination, exploiting dif-
ferences in demand elasticities between
different end products, means unequal
profitability between different lines and local
dairies. AR pricing is a way of pooling revenues
and costs. Obviously, this method is equi-
valent to a system of cross-subsidization. As
will be shown later, domestic products like
milk powder and goat cheese are cross-
subsidized by fluid milk, while foreign
consumers are cross-subsidized by domestic
consumers.
A system based on cross-subsidization is
threatened by cream skimming from entrants
(private dairy companies) preferring to supply
the most profitable products or markets and
leaving the incumbent (the cooperative) to
supply the less profitable products.  Until
1997, cream skimming from private dairies
was avoided by different kinds of institutional
entry barriers.6 In June 1997 most of the
institutional entry barriers were removed.7
However, at the same time NAMB introduced
a milk price equalization scheme (MPES).
Dairies (including the cooperative) are now
obliged to pay a tax for profitable products,
and for unprofitable products they receive a
subsidy. By law the scheme is self-financing,
i.e. a zero surplus solution where the total
taxes collected equal the paid subsidies. Let 
us use figure 2 to illustrate the main principle
in the milk price equalization scheme.
Drinking milk is now taxed by (P
_
A–P ), milk
for other domestic uses is subsidized by 
(P – P
_
B ), while exports are subsidized by 
(P – P
_
E  ). Since all dairies are treated on an
equal basis, cream skimming is avoided.
The main objective of the MPES is to
strengthen competition in the dairy sector by
removing institutional entry restrictions. As
such, the scheme is a response to the general
criticism that monopolies tend to have low
efficiency, and also a response to results of
economic research that suggest that co-
operatives are less efficient than other
organization forms (Porter and Scully, pp.
Efficiency losses in milk marketing boards – the importance of exports 83
5. In 1998 approximately 16% of the Norwegian milk production was exported at a loss (today this share is 12%).
As a means to limit the surplus production of milk, a production quota system applies at the farm level, but the
system is highly inefficient as the total production level still exceeds by far the quantity necessary to supply the
domestic market. It is therefore not considered in the model. 
6. It was almost impossible for entrants to get milk supplies from farmers since all the existing milk farmers were
members of the cooperative and legally unable to change dairy company.  Milk supplies from new farmers were
also ruled out as a result of a closed quota system.  Potential entrants in the dairy sector were therefore obliged
to buy milk from the cooperative, which would be their rival in the end market.  Another severe barrier to com-
petition was the cooperative’s dual role as competitor in the market place on one hand, and as administrator of
the pool system on the other hand.  
7. By repealing the law, which made it difficult for farmers to change dairy company and by introducing tradable
production quotas at the farm level, the new scheme makes it easier for entrants to receive supplies from the
farmers. The scheme also facilitates competition by moving the administrative responsibility for the pool sys-
tem from the cooperative to the NAMB.
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511-12, 1987). While this may have led to
some improvement in efficiency in the dairy
industry, the MPES implies no major change
in the practice of cross-subsidizing export and
some domestic products by imposing a levy
on other domestic products, especially
drinking milk. Hence, the issue of welfare
losses due to price discrimination and cross-
subsidization is just as relevant as before the
reform. 
Simulation of the current policy
Model description
In order to estimate the efficiency loss due to
the Norwegian market policy for dairy
products, we use a price endogenous, partial
equilibrium model that includes the most
important products and factors in the
Norwegian agricultural sector.  It is a partial
equilibrium model in the sense that input
prices as well as export prices are determined
outside the model and treated as given.
However, domestic linear demand functions
for the main agricultural products are
included, hence the term price endogenous
(see McCarl and Spreen, 1980).
In this section we focus on some important
details regarding the model’s representation
of the dairy sector. A fuller description of the
model is given in appendix 2.8 Eight dairy
products or aggregates are modeled:  Cow
milk, goat milk, fluid milk, cheese, whey
cheese9, goat cheese, butter and milk powder.
Cow milk and goat milk are delivered from
milk farms to dairies.10 The remaining
products are aggregates delivered from dairies
to wholesale or retail dealers. Cow and goat
milk are converted into dairy products by six
different dairy processes or model dairies.  The
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8. The model is designed to perform policy analyses, and has as such been used by the Norwegian Ministry of
Finance and the Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture.  A detailed description of an earlier version of the model
is given in Brunstad et al. (1995a). For a description of the current version, see Gaasland et al. (2001).
9. Whey cheese is a traditional Norwegian product made by boiling down milk and whey. 
10. At the farm level, milk production is represented by about 75 model farms of varying size (from 6 to 200 cows)
and location (9 production regions), each characterized by fixed input and output coefficients.
Table 3:  Production processes in the dairy sector
Product Process
Fluid milk Cheese dom. Cheese export Whey cheese Goat cheese Milk powder 
Cow milk (litre) -1.031 -10.061 -11.122  -12.260    -12.340  
Goat milk (litre) -8.690
Fluid milk (litre)  1.000
Cheese, domestic (kg) 1.000   1.000
Cheese, export (kg) 1.000
Whey cheese  (kg)  0.529                
Goat cheese (kg) 1.000
Milk powder  (kg) 1.000
Butter  (kg) 0.006     0.194  0.177           0.586     
Processing costs1 (NOK) 3.07 19.50 20.43 18.50 15.88 14.71
1. These costs are scaled to balance total revenues and costs. The scaling factor constitutes 1.5% of the input value (25 million NOK) of farm milk.
This factor can be interpreted as the costs which are left out at the process level, like administration costs in the milk price equalization scheme.
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model dairies are characterized by fixed
conversion coefficients for milk into each
product.  The conversion coefficients and
processing costs for each model dairy are
presented in table 3.  Note that four of the
model dairies have butter as a by-product.
The domestic demand functions are
linearized to go through the price/quantity
combination of the base year (1998) using the
following demand elasticities: cheese and
whey cheese (0.5), butter (1.0), milk powder
(1.0) and fluid milk (0.3). These elasticities
correspond to the common assumption that
the demand for fluid milk is less elastic than
the demand for butter, milk powder and
cheese, and are roughly in line with several
existing studies.11 Cross-price effects are
neglected as we use broad product aggregates
which hardly are close substitutes in
consumption, except for cheese and whey
cheese.
The base solution: The milk price 
equalization scheme (MPES)
Using the model, we have simulated the
agricultural policy in Norway by im-
plementing the actual system of subsidies and
import barriers in the base year 1998,12 as well
as the MPES. As earlier explained, the MPES
means price discrimination between different
uses of milk and between different markets.
The taxes and subsidies in the scheme are
listed in table 4. We see that the “price-
inelastic-processes” (fluid milk and whey
cheese) are heavily taxed, while the “price-
elastic-processes” (milk powder and export of
cheese) are heavily subsidized.
The results from this simulation, which is
called the base solution, are presented in the
first column of table 5. Production (P) and
net imports (I) figures are given. Con-
sumption is the difference between these
magnitudes. Numbers in brackets are per-
centage of the actual situation.
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11. See Gustavsen et al. (1998).
12. At the farm level, the Norwegian agricultural policy is based on different kinds of subsidies.  First, there are sub-
stantial budget transfers in the form of deficiency payments (general and regionally differentiated), acreage and
headage payments, disaster payments, transport subsidies, structural adjustment measures etc.  Second, support
is also given in the form of import tariffs.  Third, a system of tradable production quotas for milk gives regional
protection.  It should also be noted that the subsidies in general favor small farms in scarcely populated areas.
Consequently, the Norwegian agricultural policy is to a large extent directed at rural employment and protec-
tion of the family farm.  For a recent description of the Norwegian agricultural policy, see OECD (pp. 182-
187, 2003).
Table 4: Tax (+) and subsidies (-) in the Norwegian MMB
Process Tax/Subsidy
(NOK per process unit) % of production value
Fluid milk 1.70 20.6%
Cheese, domestic -2.44 4.8%
Cheese, export -31.99 131.2%
Whey cheese 10.72 15.1%
Goat cheese -1.63 3.3%
Milk powder -18.39 48.1%
Butter, export *) -10.90 80.7%
*) NOK per product unit
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For most products there is a good corre-
spondence between the model results and the
actual situation. An exception is butter, which
is a by-product of most dairy processes. For
employment and land use, there is a
substantial deviation between the base
solution and the actual situation. The reason
for this is threefold: First, the model does not
cover products such as fruit and vegetables.
Second, extreme small-scale farming is not
included. Third, since the available data on
the production processes are based on better
than average farms, the model farms tend to
be too efficient in the use of labor.
As is seen from the base solution, the level
of support given to Norwegian agriculture is
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Table 5:  Production, trade, support, economic surplus and main input levels in the 
Norwegian agriculture
Base solution No export Internal deregulation
Production (P) and 
net imports (I): P I P I P I
(million kilos)
Cow milk *) 1671.5 (100) 1379.1 1308.1
Fluid milk *) 635.4 (100) 635.4 677.1
Cheese 75.7 (103) -25.1 50.7 50.4
Whey cheese 11.8 (100) -3.3 8.5 10.9
Milk powder 14.5   (94) 14.5 4.7
Butter 22.3 (147) -10.2 19.0 12.6
Goat milk *) 22.2   (99) 22.2 21.8
Goat cheese 2.6 (100) 2.6 2.5
Meat 233.0   (94) 1.0 233.5 1.0 233.6 1.0
Coarse grains 1021.3 (101) 135.0 928.1 135.0 904.7 135.0
Wheat 210.5 (105) 263.0 209.9 263.7 209.3 264.3
Potatoes 298.0   (96) 299.1 299.0
Eggs 43.8   (99) 0.7 43.8 0.7 43.8 0.7
Employment: 
(1000 man-years) 59.7   (73) 56.4 55.1
Remote areas    40.1 36.3 35.1
Central area 19.6 20.1 20.0
Land use: (million hectares) 0.85   (86) 0.79 0.78
Economic surplus: 
(billion NOK) 14.4 15.4 15.9
+ Consumers’ surplus 21.9 21.9 23.2
+ Producers’ surplus 0.8 0.3 0.6
+ Surplus MPES 0.0 1.2 0.0
+ Tariff revenues 0.3 0.3 0.3
-  Taxpayers’ expenses 8.6 8.3 8.2
Support: (billion NOK) 15.2  (77) 15.0 13.8
Budget support 8.6   (71) 8.3 8.2
Border measures 6.6   (86) 6.7 5.6
*)  Million litres
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extremely high (NOK 15.2 billion or USD
2.0 billion).13 Since Norwegian agriculture
employs about 60,000 man years, the support
per man year is about NOK 250,000 (USD
32,500).  Apart from grain, Norway is self-
sufficient or has a surplus in agricultural
products. In particular, there are large exports
of both cheese and butter.
Deregulation
In two steps we now analyze the effects of
deregulating the markets for dairy products.
First, we assume that export subsidies are
abolished. By comparing this case with the
base solution, the cost of export is revealed.
Thereafter, a complete deregulation is
assumed by setting all MPES-rates to zero. By
doing so, we are also able to deduce the
efficiency losses caused by Harberger
distortions in the domestic markets.  
No export subsidies
While abolishing export subsidies, other
MPES-rates are set such that prices on
domestic dairy products are unchanged. By
holding domestic prices and consumption
unchanged, we are able to isolate export costs.   
Since export prices are way below production
costs, in spite of substantial subsidies at the farm
level,14 the dumping of dairy products stops, as
shown in column 2 in table 5.  The 292.4 million
litres (17.5%) decline in milk production,
compared to the base solution, is solely due to
the elimination of exports.
This leads to a surplus in the MPES-system
of NOK 1.2 billion. If this surplus is allocated
to the milk producers, producer surplus will
increase by NOK 0.7 billion (1.5-0.8=0.7)
compared to the base solution. The overall
increase in economic surplus is NOK 1.0
billion, of which NOK 0.7 billion is due to
higher producer surplus, while NOK 0.3
billion can be explained by lower budget
support, mainly because of lower milk
production and fewer farms. In 1998 the
production value of milk was NOK 5.7
billion. Consequently, the NOK 1 billion
efficiency gain amounts to 17.5 per cent of
the production value.15
In a similar experiment for the Canadian
dairy sector, Schluep (1999) found that
elimination of export subsidies leads to an
increase in economic surplus of 0.7 per cent of
the production value.16 The reason for this
small efficiency loss is twofold: First, a major
part of the Canadian export is excluded from
the Canadian pooling arrangements.17 Second,
the cost of marginal milk production is
substantially lower in Canada than in Norway.
Internal deregulation
In addition to export costs, there are efficiency
losses caused by Harberger distortions in the
domestic markets. To highlight these costs,
we assume a complete deregulation, i.e. all
MPES-rates are set to zero. Consequently, we
obtain prices which equal marginal costs.
Import restrictions are maintained, which
means that the focus is on internal deregula-
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13. The actual agricultural support in 1998 was approximately NOK 20 billion (USD 2.6 billion).
14. For example, the average revenue from the cheese export process is NOK 24.40, while the costs are NOK 58.25
(not reported). The cost–number can be inferred by using table 3: Processing costs for export of cheese is NOK
20.43. The market price of milk is NOK 3.40 (not reported). The milk requirement is 11.122. Using this infor-
mation and adding up, NOK 58.25 is the result.  
15. This percentage equals the percentage decrease in the milk production. However, this is an arbitrarily coinci-
dence.   
16. Schluep (1999), p. 105.
17. Class Ve is not included.
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tion. The farm level subsidies are unaltered.
The exact framing and accomplishment of the
deregulation is beyond the scope of this paper,
but removal of the MPES is a basic condition. 
The results of this experiment are
presented in column 3 in table 5 and in table
6. As we observe from table 6, not only export
is cross-subsidized in the base solution but in
particular also domestically sold milk powder.
The deregulation means an increase in the
domestic price of this product by as much as
68.9%. Furthermore, in the base solution
whey cheese and fluid milk are substantially
overpriced. Therefore, the consumption of
whey cheese and fluid milk increases as a result
of the transition to cost-based pricing, while
the consumption of milk powder decreases.
The substantial drop in the consumption of
milk powder should be seen in the light of the
assumed unitary price elasticity.18
As a result of the deregulation, economic
surplus increases by NOK 1.5 billion
compared to the base solution, i.e. 26.3% of
the production value of milk. Consumers and
taxpayers are the main gainers.  As a result of
lower domestic prices on fluid milk and whey
cheese, and despite higher prices on milk
powder, the consumer surplus increases by 1.3
billion NOK (23.2% of production value).
Due to lower milk production, and thereby
less subsidies to milk farmers, the taxpayers
gain NOK 0.4 billion.  The producer surplus
decreases by NOK 0.2 billion because of the
decline in milk production.
An objection to our model simulation is
that deregulation will hardly lead to perfect
competition and cost-based pricing.
Although institutional entry barriers have
been removed, there are many kinds of
technical and strategic entry barriers, which
may continue to hamper competition, such
as economies of scale, sunk costs and transport
costs.19 The industry norm is, as noted by
Sexton (1990) and Tennbakk (1995), that
cooperatives coexist with other firms in
markets that are structural oligopolies or
oligopsonies. Thus, the estimate in this section
should be interpreted as the maximum gain
by deregulating the dairy sector.
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Table 6: Wholesale prices (NOK per kg or litre)
Base         Internal            Percentage 
solution     deregulation           change                      
Fluid milk  8.14  6.53    - 19.8%
Cheese 46.60               47.37     +  1.6%
Whey cheese 45.95    20.12   - 56.2%
Goat cheese 49.36   51.13   +  3.5%
Milk powder  24.18   40.83    +68.9%
Butter 24.04   23.32    -  3.0%
18. Milk powder is mainly demanded by the processing industry, used as an input in the production of for exam-
ple chocolate and ice cream. The assumed elasticity for milk powder is derived from these products.
19. Since the introduction of the MPES, three private dairies have expanded their production rapidly. However,
they still have low market shares, especially at the farm gate level (about 2%). The highest market share is in the
wholesale market for cheese (about 10%). Other entrants have tried to enter the market, but have failed.
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Concluding remarks
A marketing board is a well known instrument
for regulating the markets for dairy products.
Since it is based on price discrimination, it
causes economic losses. Our findings suggest
that a deregulation of the Norwegian dairy
industry could increase the economic surplus
by as much as 26.3% of the milk production
value. This computed gain is far larger than
for the other countries reviewed in table 1 and
2. The main reasons are that exports are a main
ingredient of the Norwegian MMB, and that
production costs of milk are very high in
Norway. In addition, there is some evidence
that the Norwegian MMB-regulation is
stronger than in other countries, based on the
following reasoning: The strength of a
country’s regulation may be estimated by the
effect on the price of fluid milk, since fluid
milk is regarded as the most inelastic product
and therefore most exposed for taxation. For
the U.S. this indicator is 13.9% (Cox and
Chavas (2001), p. 101), compared to 19.8%
for Norway (table 6).
The literature offers many arguments in
favour of MMBs or marketing cooperations.
In a recent article by Bouamra-Mechemache
et al. (2001), the possibility of introducing an
MMB in the EU is discussed. Their argument
is that, as long as the total milk production is
kept unchanged by the quota system, an
MMB is an effective way of transferring
money from consumers to farmers. The reason
is according to Bouamra-Mechemache et al.
(2001, p. 9) that “the welfare cost of price
discrimination policy could be as low as, or
lower than fully decoupled payments when
the opportunity cost of public funds is taken
into considerations.” However, this argument
is not valid if transfers are used to promote
exports.
When evaluating the regulations, there is
always the question whether there are social
benefits to outweigh the substantial costs of
the current policies.  There are several alleged
benefits of regulation, spanning from the
original objectives in the 1930s, namely to
raise and stabilize milk prices and offset
monopsony power, to current objectives
related to rural employment and farm
incomes.  However, under the present market
conditions it is hardly probable that these
benefits justify government interventions of
the magnitude we have described for Norway.
The regulations may have been relevant at the
time when they were passed, i.e. during the
depression in the 1930s, but they are now out
of date due to technological development and
structural change. For example, farmers’
bargaining power towards dairy companies
has increased due to lower transportation costs
and better conservation methods.  The
rationale for price stabilizing interventions in
the market is also weakened, partly because
farm level production has become more
predictable, and partly because technology
makes it easier to deliver milk products in
time (storage) and space (trade).  Regarding
rural employment, it might be argued that
deregulation will have a negative effect on
agricultural employment in rural areas,
estimated to be 4,000 man-years (-10.2%).20
However, it is well established that the most
efficient way to achieve rural employment is
by means of general income support to all
inhabitants or general wage subsidies to all
industries in a particular region (see e.g.
Winters 1989-1990), and not by support
confined to a single industry.  If the authorities
still want to pay specific support to
agriculture, production neutral support is
definitely more efficient than export subsidies
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20. See Brunstad, Gaasland and Vårdal (1995b) for a more detailed discussion of issues regarding rural employment.
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and price support of the kind used in the
Norwegian dairy sector.
So why does an arrangement that is not
desirable neither for economic nor for social
reasons continue to exist? One answer is that
MMBs serve as a useful instrument for
farmers, and through lobbying they have been
able to maintain this institution. However,
discrimination between foreign and domestic
products is a violation of basic WTO-
principles. In the Uruguay Round it was
agreed that by the end of the year 2000 export
subsidies should be reduced by 36% as of the
situation in 1992. In the ongoing Doha round
in WTO, it is agreed to eliminate export
subsidies with 2013 as a deadline. The harm
from MMB arrangements such as the
Norwegian NAMB will thus be reduced.
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Appendix 1. Efficiency loss in MMBs
Country Description Welfare Loss
(i) Canada
Schmitz (Barichello) Abolishing fluid and industrial CAD 214 million annual welfare gain
milk regulation CAD 955 million annual loss in producer surplus
CAD 980 million annual gain in consumer surplus
CAD 303 million annual gain for taxpayers
Lippert Abolishing fluid and industrial CAD 200 million annual welfare gain
milk regulation CAD 987 million annual transfer from consumer to
producers
(ii) USA
Dardis/Bedore Eliminating MMO 1985 USD 343-608 million annual welfare gain
Helmberger/Chen Long run impact of USD 444 million annual loss in producer surplus
eliminating MMO 1990 USD 1 billion annual gain in consumer surplus for fluid milk 
USD 648 million annual loss in consumer surplus 
for manufactured milk
Cox/Chavas Eliminating MMO 1995 USD 137 million annual welfare gain
USD 368 million (2.3%) decrease in producer surplus
USD 505 million (0.9%) increase in consumer surplus
(iii) Japan
Kawaguchi et al. Deregulation 14.7 % decrease in the milk price
(iv) Australia
Freebairn Abolishing the levy system AUD 25-65 million in estimated welfare gain 
1988/1989
(v) United Kingdom
Anderson Eliminating MMB 1994 Ecu 89 mill. (2.54%) decrease in producer surplus
Ecu 387 mill. (2.61%) increase in consumer surplus 
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Appendix 2.  The model
For given input costs, demand functions and
support systems the model computes market
clearing prices and quantities. Prices of goods
produced outside the agricultural sector or
abroad are taken as given. As the model
assumes full mobility of labor and capital, it
must be interpreted as a long run model.
The model includes the most important
products produced by the Norwegian
agricultural sector, in all 13 final and 8
intermediary products. Most products are
aggregates.  Primary inputs are: land (three
different grades), labor (family members and
hired), capital (machinery, buildings,
livestock and ditches) and other inputs
(fertilizers, fuel, seeds, etc.). The prices of
inputs are determined outside the model and
treated as given.
On the supply side the model has about
1000 model farms with fixed coefficients
(Leontief technology), covering 19 different
production activities in 6 scales and 9 regions.
The regional division reflects differences in
climatic conditions, support systems and
available land. The products from the model
farms go through processing plants before
they are offered on the market. The processing
plants are partly modeled as pure cost mark-
ups (meat, eggs and fruit), and partly as
production processes of the same type as the
model farms (milk and grains). Imports take
place at given world market prices inclusive of
tariffs and transport costs. Domestic and
foreign products are assumed to be perfect
substitutes.
The domestic demand for final products
is represented by linear demand functions.
These demand functions are based on existing
studies of demand elasticities, and are
linearized to go through the observed price
and quantity combination in the base year
(1998). Between the meat products there are
cross-price effects, while only own-price
effects are considered for other products. The
demand for intermediary products is derived
from the demand for the final products for
which they are inputs. Exports take place at
given world market prices. 
Domestic demand for final products is
divided among 5 separate demand regions,
which have their own demand functions. Each
demand region consists of one or several
production regions. If products are
transported from one region to another,
transport costs are incurred. For imports and
exports, transport costs are incurred from the
port of entry and to the port of shipment
respectively.
In principle, restrictions can be placed on
all variables in the model.  The restrictions
can be divided into two groups:
(1) Scarcity restrictions: upper limits for the
endowment of each grade of land in each
region.  
(2) Political restrictions: lower limits for land
use and employment in each region, for 
groups of regions (central regions and
remote areas), or for the country as a
whole; maximum or minimum quantities
for domestic production, imports or
exports; maximum prices.
Different types of objective functions are used,
depending on the market structure. When
assuming perfect competition, total economic
surplus (consumer surplus, producer surplus
and importer surplus) of the agricultural
sector is maximized. The maximization is
performed subject to demand and supply
relationships and the imposed restrictions.
The restrictions applied depend on the
scenario. The solution to the model is found
as the prices and quantities that give
equilibrium in each market. No restrictions
must be violated, and no model farm or
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processing plant that is active, must be run at
a loss.
The model reports figures like production,
use of inputs, domestic consumption and
prices, import and export, support and
economic surplus measured as the sum of
consumer, producer and importer surplus. A
more technical description of the model is
given in Brunstad et al. (1995a).
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Appendix 3. Subsidies and taxes
given by the NAMB
The taxes and subsidies in table 4 equal the
difference between revenues and costs of the
various dairy processes in table 3. In principle,
these rates equal the official rates given by the
NAMB. However, there are some differences.
First, the rates of NAMB are tied to products
rather than processes. Second, NAMB uses
more disaggregated products and markets
than in our model. Third, transportation costs
are rebated separately. Fourth, the rates are
measured at a higher level of the vertical chain
than in the model. In this appendix we
compare the official rates with the rates
reported in table 4.  
NAMB comprises two arrangements:
First, the milk price equalization scheme
(MPES) taxes some products and gives
subsidies to others. Furthermore, MPES
grants subsidies for transportation of milk
from farms to dairies and from dairies to
retailers.
Second, a marketing fee is collected on all
milk delivered to dairies. In 1998 this fee was
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Table A.1: The rates in the MPES 
Rate (R) Conversion (C) Share (S) RxSx
NOK per liter Liter raw milk per NOK per product unit
raw  milk product unit
Fluid milk aggregate
Yoghurt 0.958 0.895 0.043 0.0369
Drinking milk 1.602 1.098 0.820 1.4424
Chokomilk -0.036 1.168 0.022 -0.0009
Milk for industrial use -0.914 1.142 0.058 -0.0605
Full cream 7.7321 1.036 0.057 0.4566
1.8745
Cheese aggregate, domestic
Cottage cheese 0.0932 6.379 0.22 0.1305
Cheese for consumption -0.097 11.122 0.53 -0.5718
Cheese for industrial use -0.389 11.040 0.25 -1.0736
-1.5149
Whey cheese 2.6313 7.874 20.706
Goat cheese 0.284 8.690 2.47
Milk powder -0.854 12.340 -10.5384
Butter -8.5915 2.2386 -19.2267
Export of cheese
Brand name (MPES) -1.333 11.122 0.607 -9.000
Bulk
(i) MPES -0.389 11.040 0.393 -1.688
(ii) Marketing fee  -2.223 -9.645
-20.333
Export of butter (Marketing fee) -6.15
1. NOK per liter cream
2. Average of the rates for consumption and industrial use 
3. NOK per liter whey
4. Liter whey per kilo whey cheese
5. NOK per liter cream
6. Liter cream per kilo butter
Sources:
Gaasland et al. (2001), pp. 22-25.
Omsetningsrådet (1998), p. 10.
Omsetningsrådets Sekretariat (1998), p. 14 and p. 34.
}
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NOK 0.23 per liter farm milk, and it was used
to finance exports of cheese and butter, to
subsidize transportation, to cover
administrative expenses and to finance a
program for school milk.
Official tax and subsidy rates
In table A.1 the MPES-rates are adapted to
our level of aggregation. The first column
reports the official tax and subsidy rates given
by the MPES. A negative entry means a
subsidy. The second column reports how
much farm milk is needed to produce one unit
of the product. Then, weighted by the
commodity shares in the third column, the
fourth column gives the tax and subsidy rate
for the various products in the model. 
In the table there are altogether eight
product aggregates. The first six refer to
domestic sales, while the last two are for
exports. Notice that exports are financed both
through the MPES and the marketing fee.
Multiplying the bold marked product rates
in table A.1 with the coefficients in table 3,
we obtain tax and subsidy rates on a process
level, reported in the first column of table A.2.
Transportation subsidies are written into the
second column, and net rates are found in the
third column.
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Table A.2: Subsidy and tax rates in the MPES. Process level
MPES-gross rates Transport,a.s.o. MPES-net rates
NOK per process unit NOK per process unit NOK per process unit
Processes:
Fluid milk 1.76 -0.60 1.16
Cheese, domestic -5.25 -2.01 -7.26
Whey cheese 9.44 -2.45 6.99
Goat cheese 2.47 -2.47 0.00
Milk powder -21.81 -2.72 -24.53
Cheese, export  -23.73 -1.98 -25.71
Sources: Gaasland et al. (2001), pp. 22-25
Table A.3: The MPES rates used in the model
MPES-net Marketing fee Adjusted 
rates and deficit MPES-rates Model rates
Domestic Sale
Milk process 1.16 0.50 1.66 1.70
Cheese process -7.26 4.96 -2.30 -2.44
Whey cheese process 6.99 6.04 13.03 10.72
Goat cheese process 0.00 2.63 2.63 -1.63
Milk powder process -24.53 6.08 -18.45 -18.39
Export
Cheese process -25.71 4.28 -21.43 -31.99
Butter -6.15 -6.15 -10.90
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The tax and subsidy rates used in the
model 
The official MPES rates are based on a farm
gate price of NOK 3.893 per liter.21 In reality,
the farm gate price is lower (NOK 3.40 per
liter). The wedge is due to:
(i) the milk marketing fee,  
(ii) the loss in the dairy sector which is passed
on to the farmers, and 
(iii) additional costs covered by the farmers. 
In 1998 the marketing fee was NOK 0.23 per
litre farm milk. The remaining NOK 0.263 is
costs attributable to (ii) and (iii). To take
account of the wedge, the MPES rates are
adjusted by multiplying NOK 0.493 with the
respective farm milk requirement of each
process, given in the first line of table 3. For
the milk process this amounts to NOK
0.493x1.013 = NOK 0.50. This adjustment
is written into the second column of table A.3.
The third column gives the adjusted MPES
rates.
We also have to make some individual
corrections. As for exports the MPES-rates
are based on prices at a higher level of the
vertical chain than in our model. With regard
to goat cheese the MPES-rates are based on
the farm gate price of goat milk, while our
model treats goat milk as a separate product.
Finally, whey cheese is based on a separate
arrangement for subsidizing whey. When
taking this into account, we obtain the model
rates in the last column. 
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21. See Omsetningsrådets Sekretariat (1998), p. 34.
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